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THE DENIAL OF BENEFITS TO THE SAME-SEX
DOMESTIC PARTNERS OF STATE EMPLOYEES:
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Alex Turnert
[L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of
the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed,
and manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace
with the times.1
Discrimination in employment on the basis of sexuality continues to
impact a significant portion of our nation's workforce.2 Surveys indicate
that between sixteen percent and forty-four percent of gays and lesbians
have experienced employment discrimination on the basis of their
sexuality. This discrimination takes many forms, including harrassment,
wrongful termination, pay discrepancy, and the refusal to extend
employment benefits to domestic partners. The latter form of
discrimination is particularly pervasive because employee benefits are a
significant portion of an employee's compensation.4
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1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, Monticello, July 12, 1816,
available at http:lmemory.loc.gov./cgi-bin/querylP?mtg:./temp/-anunem-NQDh.html.
2. See Alan W. Richardson, Sexual Orientation Rights in the Workplace: A Proposal
for Revising and Reconsidering California's Assembly Bill 101, 26 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 425,
437 n.69 (1993) (citing studies approximating that between one percent and ten percent of
the population are gay or lesbian); Kenneth Sherrill, The Political Power of Lesbians, Gays,
and Bisexuals (Vote for Me: Politics in America), PS: POL. SCL & POL., Sept. 1, 1996,
available at 1996 WL 13538092, at *2 (citing more recent surveys that place the figure
closer to three percent).
3. Shawn M. Filippi & Edward J. Reeves, Equality or Further Discrimination? Sexual
Orientation Nondiscrimination in Oregon Statutory Employment Law After Tanner V.
OHSU, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 269, 277 n.41 (1999) (citing twenty studies
conducted between 1980 and 1991).
4. Filippi & Reeves, supra note 3, at 285 ("For same-sex domestic partners, the lack of
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Contrary to popular belief,5 gays and lesbians employed in the United
States do not have adequate legal remedies against discrimination in
employee benefits. Because there is no effective federal protection against
discrimination on the basis of sexuality, and because the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") preempts state and local
prohibitions against such discrimination,6 most same-sex patners have no
legal remedy when they are denied the fringe benefits that married couples
enjoy.
For this reason, most discussions regarding the effective use of these
remedies in benefits discrimination focus primarily on the obstacle of
ERISA preemption. However, because ERISA does not apply to
"governmental plans,"' a different analysis applies to the fifteen million
state employees. 9 Where ERISA does not apply, employees who seek
domestic partner benefits for their same-sex partners have state and local
remedies available to them. This comment concerns itself with the
applicability and effectiveness of these remedies in regard to state
administered, ERISA-style benefit plans,' °  since state employees
participating in such plans are in a unique position to employ the various
legal claims made possible by state and local law. Part one provides
these benefits can be significant because employee benefits usually comprise between 30%
and 40% of total employee compensation.").
5. See Jane T. Monahan et al., Gay & Lesbian Civil Rights: Marriage is not Enough,
15 DEL. LAW. 10, 10 (1997) ("[S]urveys of the American public show that a majority of
Americans believe that gay and lesbian individuals already have or are entitled to equal
protection of the law and freedom from discrimination.").
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2002). ERISA's preemption of state and local prohibitions
against discrimination in employment benefits has been extensively discussed by many
commentators. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption of State and Local Laws on
Domestic Partnership and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Employment, 8 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 267 (1998); Susan Katz Hoffman, ERISA Basics: A Primer on ERISA Issues:
Discrimination Litigation Relating to Employee Benefits, 1997 A.B.A. CTR. FOR
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. N-1 (1997).
7. See Paul R. Lynd, Domestic Partner Benefits Limited to Same-Sex Couples: Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 561, 575 (2000) ("As a
result of its broad preemptive effect, ERISA preemption should be the starting point in any
analysis of domestic partnership benefits."); see also Lukus v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
419 A.2d 431, 440 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (discussing whether the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act is preempted by ERISA).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (1999). "Governmental plan" is defined in 29 U.S.C.
§1002(3)(32)(1999) as "a plan established or maintained for its employees by the
Government of the United States, by the government of any State or political subdivision
thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing."
9. U.S. Census Bureau, Federal Government Employment and Payroll Data (Apr.
2000), at http:lwww.census.gov/govs/www/apesfed.htm(last modified Jan. 2, 2002).
10. I use the term "ERISA-style benefit plans," to mean plans modeled after those
regulated by ERISA but excluded from such regulation due to its status as a "governmental
plan."
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background on federal law, which highlights the importance of state and
local anti-discrimination remedies, as well as ERISA's government plan
exception, which makes these remedies available to employees. Part two
surveys the effectiveness of these remedies in challenging the denial of
domestic partner benefits to same-sex partners and draws conclusions
regarding successful strategies.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STATE AND LOCAL ORDINANCES FOR STATE
EMPLOYEES CONTESTING THE DENIAL OF DOMESTIC PARTNER
BENEFITS To SAME-SEX PARTNERS
ERISA does not preempt federal law prohibiting discrimination in
employment. Therefore, both public and private employees seeking to
obtain benefits for their same-sex partner have access to federal remedies.
However, because these federal constitutional and statutory claims are
largely ineffective regarding discrimination on the basis of sexuality, state
and local statutes provide the only means of addressing such
discrimination. This section discusses the lack of federal remedies for
sexuality-based discrimination and the consequential importance of the
governmental plan exception to state employees.
A. Federal Remedies for Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual
Orientation
Prohibitions against discrimination in employment exist as a result of
executive orders issued by the President, as well as constitutional and
statutory federal law." The former, while addressing discrimination
against gays and lesbians directly, applies only to federal employees. 12 As
a result, this discussion will focus on the remedies available through
constitutional and statutory law.
1. Federal Constitutional Law
There are no effective federal constitutional protections against
discrimination on the basis of sexuality. The Supreme Court has held that
gays and lesbians are not a protected class, and thus distinctions made by
11. Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998) (amending Exec.
Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1969)).
12. Id. Congressional attempts to limit the effectiveness of this order have so far been
unsuccessful. However, it remains to be seen whether subsequent administrations will
support the order. See Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: Twenty Years Later,
50 HASTINGS L.J. 1179, 1193 (1999) ("The general understanding is that an executive order
can be rescinded by the next executive.").
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the state on the basis of sexuality are subject to the "toothless"' 3 rational
basis test.14  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that gays and
lesbians do not have the same due process fundamental right to privacy in
their intimate relations that heterosexual couples enjoy. 15 As a result, the
federal Constitution offers little relief to employees seeking the same
partner benefits extended to married couples.
2. Federal Statutory Law
Title VII prevents private employers from discriminating "against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national orin ....16 The statute does not list sexual orientation as a
protected classification. However, the denial of benefits to a same-sex
partner is arguably discrimination on the basis of sex because, but for the
partner's sex, they would be eligible for benefits. Courts applying Title VII
have been uniformly unconvinced by this argument, finding that Title VII
does not offer protections against discrimination on the basis of sexuality.
17
ERISA preempts only state law.' 8  Employees who experience
discrimination in the terms of their benefits plan do have access to federal
remedies. However, as the above discussion demonstrates, federal law is
not applicable to discrimination on the basis of sexuality.' 9 Therefore, gays
13. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999) ("In the past twenty-
five years, the Court has decided ten [successful claims under the rational basis standard],
while during the same time period, it has rejected rational basis arguments on one hundred
occasions.").
14. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ("[Ilf a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so
long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end."); but see Raffi S. Baroutjian,
Note, The Advent of the Multifactor, Sliding-Scale Standard of Equal Protection Review:
Out with the Traditional Three-Tier Method of Analysis, in with Romer v. Evans, 30 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 1277 (1997) (arguing that the Court actually employed heightened scrutiny).
15. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (2002).
17. See Lynd, supra note 7, at 591; see also Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99
F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) ('Title VII does not afford a cause of action for discrimination
based upon sexual orientation."); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69,
70 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals."), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30
(9th Cir. 1979) ("Title VII's prohibition of 'sex' discrimination applies only to
discrimination on the basis of gender and should not be judicially extended to include sexual
preference such as homosexuality.") (citations ommitted).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (2002).
19. But see the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2001 [herinafter ENDA], H.R.
2692, 107th Cong. (2001) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual
orientation). Although the ENDA, if passed, would offer important employment
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and lesbians must turn to state and local protections against discrimination,
available only where ERISA does not apply; hence the importance of the
governmental plan exception.
B. The Governmental Plan Exception
Section 1003 (b) of ERISA states that its provisions "shall not apply to
any employee benefit plan if... such plan is a governmental plan."
20
ERISA defines "governmental plan" as "a plan established or maintained
for its employees by the Government of the United States, by the
government of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency
or instrumentality of any of the foregoing."2 Because governmental plans
are subject to more state regulation regarding employment discrimination,22
and because ERISA applicability can determine federal jurisdiction, a
plan's status as "governmental" is often an issue of litigation. Courts
interpret the exception narrowly, applying it to "'organizations traditionally
characterized as governmental organizations' but not 'to include
organizations having some significant relationship with a government but
not themselves viewed as governmental." '23 ERISA does not define the
terms "political subdivision," "agency," or "instrumentality." Courts have
therefore analogized from definitions in other areas of law. In Rose v. Long
24Island Rail Road Pension Plan, the Circuit Court applied a test developed
by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility District.2' Under this
test, an organization is a "political subdivision" if it is "either (1) created
directly by the state, so as to constitute departments or administrative arms
of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are responsible
to public officials or the general electorate., 26 In Culpepper v. Protective
Life Insurance Co.,27 the court looked to the factors which the IRS utilizes
in determining whether an entity is an agency or instrumentality under 26
discrimination protections to gays and lesbians, it explicitly excludes benefit plans from its
application.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (b) (2002).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (32) (2002).
22. Although these plans are subject to state law regarding employment discrimination,
they are arguably underregulated in terms of the evils which ERISA sought to eliminate.
See Jon G. Miller, Is Your Client's Government Pension Safe?: Making the Case for
Federal Regulation, 2 ELDER L.J. 121 (1994) (arguing that the pension plans of state
employees do not enjoy adequate protection under state regulation).
23. Poitier v. Sun Life of Canada, No. Civ.A. 98-3056, 1998 WL 754980, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 28, 1998), quoting Krupp v. Lincoln Univ., 663 F. Supp. 289, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
24. 828 F.2d 910, 916 (2d Cir. 1987). See also Shannon v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n,
965 F.2d 542, 548 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying the NLRB standard as well).
25. 402 U.S. 600, 604-05 (1971).
26. Id.
27. 938 F. Supp. 794, 798 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
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U.S.C. § 414(d) (2001). 28 Those factors are:
(1) whether it is used for a governmental purpose and performs a
governmental function; (2) whether performance of its function is
on behalf of one or more states or political subdivisions; (3)
whether there are any private interests involved, or whether the
states or political subdivisions involved have the powers and
interests of an owner; (4) whether control and supervision of the
organization is vested in public authority or authorities; (5) if
express or implied statutory or other authority is necessary for the
creation and/or use of such an instrumentality, and whether such
authority exists; and (6) the degree of financial autonomy and the
source of its operating expenses.29
In Culpepper, the court held that the National Guard Association and
the National Guard Association of Alabama Insurance Trust were not
government plans because they "receive[d] no funding from the National
Guard of Alabama or the United States National Guard for insurance or
otherwise" and were "separate from.., not maintained by, and.., not
established by the National Guard of Alabama."3 ° Employee organizations
"whose members just happen to be employees of a governmental entity"'"
are, therefore, not government plans.
A government plan must be "created directly by the state" or
administered by those responsible to the state.32 Although plans that do not
meet these criteria are subject to ERISA, plans that do meet the criteria
cannot evoke ERISA simply because they are modeled after ERISA
employee benefit plans.33 In Triplett v. United Behavioral Health System
Inc.,34 the defendant sought to defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction by establishing that the Pennsylvania Employee Benefit
Trust Fund ("PEBTF") was not subject to ERISA's governmental
exception. Defendant argued that because the PEBTF was "'created as a
jointly trusted health and welfare benefits fund' rather than by statute,
' 35
because PEBTF trustees do not act as "employees of the Commonwealth
28. Id.; see also Harbor Ins. Co. v. Blackwelder, 554 So. 2d 329 (Ala. 1989) (applying
the IRS factors as well).
29. Culpepper, 938 F. Supp. at 798 (citing Rev. Rul. 57-128, 1957-1 C.B. 311).
30. Id. at 799.
31. Id. at800.
32. Triplett v. United Behavioral Health Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A. 98-3065, 1999 WL
238944 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 1999).
33. Id. at *1; see also Fellion v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., No. 91 C 7887 1992 WL
159437 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1992) (finding that the plan was governmental even though it
directly refered to ERISA in its summary plan description).
34. 1999 WL 238944.
35. Id. at *2. The PEBTF was established as a result of collective bargaining between
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and AFSCME Council 13. Id.
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,,16
subject to review by more senior governmental employees, and because
the PEBTF has described itself as "an ERISA plan,"37 it is not a
"governmental plan" under ERISA.38 The court disagreed, finding none of
these arguments relevant to whether the plan was "established or
maintained for its employees by ... the government of any State.' 39 The
holding suggests that a plan can adopt many of the characteristics of an
ERISA-style plan and remain exempt from ERISA.40
The state employee who seeks to challenge the denial of benefits to
her same-sex domestic partner must qualify for the governmental plan
exception of ERISA in order to access state and local remedies. Although
plan administrators would likely argue ERISA applicability in order to
preempt potentially broader state anti-discrimination law, their argument
would likely fail if the state participated in its creation. Thus, the great
majority of state employees would have access to non-federal remedies in
challenging benefits discrimination.
41
11. THE EFFECTIvENESs OF STATE AND LOCAL REMEDIES IN
CHALLENGING THE DENIAL OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS To SAME-SEX
DoMESTIc PARTNERS
Before discussing the effectiveness of the remedies available to state
employees seeking benefits for their same-sex domestic partners, it is
important to understand the nature of the claim being made. Most plans
that deny benefits to same-sex partners do so, not on the basis of sexuality,
but on the basis of marital status.42 If state law prohibits discrimination on
the basis of marital status, then unmarried partners, both homosexual and
heterosexual alike, can challenge an employer's policy of distinguishing on
the basis of marital status. However, the law is rife with distinctions based
on marital status, and courts are hesitant to find such determinations
invalid.43
36. Id.
37. Id. at *3.
38. Id. at *2-4.
39. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002 (32) (1999)
40. Triplett, 1999 WL 238944, at *2-4 (holding that plans can be established through
trust agreements with unions, administered through an independent board of trustees, and
"work[] to meet the obligations that it believes itself to have under ERISA," and still be
considered a governmental plan).
41. The exception would be state employees covered by plans created by employee
organizations which have no connection to the state. See Culpepper v. Protective Life Ins.
Co., 938 F. Supp. 794,798 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
42. See Thomas H. Barnard & Timothy J. Downing, Emerging Law on Sexual
Orientation and Employment, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 555, 574 (1999); Fisk, supra note 6, at
279.
43. See Barnard & Downing, supra note 42, at 574.
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Where state law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, employees seeking same-sex domestic partner benefits must
argue that a policy that distinguishes on the basis of marital status
discriminates against gays and lesbians because they cannot marry.
Employers commonly counter that a distinction based on marital status is
not disrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Same-sex couples are
not covered because they are biologically unable to meet the state's
definition of "married," not because the plan declares homosexual partners
ineligible.44 Thus, any claim seeking benefits for a gay or lesbian partner
must address this counterargument.
Where state law lacks protections against discimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, employees can argue that the denial of benefits is on the
basis of sex. That is, but for the partner's gender, they would be eligible
for benefits. This is a weaker argument, because the policies do not
differentiate on the basis of sex. Rather, they differentiate on the basis of
marital status. If the employee's partner were a different sex, they would
still be ineligible as an unmarried heterosexual couple. A claim based on
sex discrimination must surpass these obstacles.
Not only must the anti-discrimination law bear upon sexual
orientation, it must also apply to employee benefits plans. A statute that
prohibits discrimination in employment may only cover hiring and
promotion or, if it is broader, it may explicitly omit benefits plans from its
scope. In order to prevail, plaintiffs must argue that the anti-discrimination
law they rely upon applies to discrimination in benefits.
Finally, state employees must be able to bring a claim against the
party denying benefits to their same-sex partners. Often, this party will not
be the state itself but rather a trust administering an employee benefits plan.
To successfully employ a law prohibiting employment discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, the employee must argue that liability exists
for the trust itself.
Employees have four areas of law on the state and local level to
challenge state employers who discriminate in benefits: state executive
orders, state constitutional law, state statutory law, and local ordinances.
A. State Executive Orders
State governors have issued executive orders banning discrimination
in public employment on the basis of sexual orientation.45 As of 1999,
44. Indeed, under such plans a gay male would be covered so long as he were legally
married to a woman.
45. Pennsylvania's Exec. Order No. 1996-9 reads: "No agency under the jurisdiction of
the Governor may discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because
of race, color, religious creed, ancestry, union membership, age, sex, sexual orientation,
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eight states have such orders: Colorado, Louisiana, Maryland, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington.46 In Rutgers
Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, the court refused to apply such an
order to a state employee, instead holding that the denial of benefits to a
same-sex domestic partner was not discrimination on the basis of sexuality,
but rather on the basis of marital status. 47 Although this argument does not
survive closer scrutiny, litigants in many states will not be able to challenge
it in regard to an executive order, because a private right of action likely
does not exist.
The right to enforce an executive order vests in the executive branch.
The federal executive order signed by President Clinton is enforced by the
Department of Labor.48 Most state executive orders are likely enforced by
state administrative agencies. A private right of action need not exist.
Several cases have held that private citizens may have no right of
action against a state employer that violates an executive order. In Shapp v.
Butera,49 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that where an
executive order "serve[s] to implement or supplement the Constitution or
statutes" and "is based upon the presence of some constitutional or
statutory provision, which authorizes the executive order either specifically
or by way of necessary implication," it is legally enforceable.' Since an
executive order is only enforceable when it is supported by a constitutional
or statutory right, it is difficult to imagine when a litigant would base a
claim on the order rather than the pertinent constitutional or statutory
provisions. Where such provisions do not exist in state law, executive
orders do not provide a remedy.
Holt v. Northwest Pennsylvania Training Partnership Consortium5'
further narrows the effectiveness of executive orders in Pennsylvania. Holt
holds that where an executive order is "intended for communication with
subordinate officials in the nature of... suggested directions for the
execution of the duties of the Executive Branch," it is not legally
enforceable.12 Thus a private right of action does not exist where the
national origin, AIDS or ILV status, or disability." 4 PA. CODE § 1.16 1(a) (2000).
46. Barnard & Downing, supra note 42, at 557-58 (citing Exec. Order No. 90-13-98
(Colo. 1990); Exec. Order No. Ewe 92-7 (La. 1992) (expired 1996); Exec. Order No.
01.01.1993.16 (Md. 1993); Exec. Order No. 85-15 (N.M. 1985); Exec. Order No. 28.1 (N.Y.
1993); Exec. Order No. 83-64 (Ohio 1983); Exec. Order No. 1988-1 (Pa. 1988); Exec. Order
No. 85-09 (Wash. 1985)).
47. Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, 689 A.2d 828, 838 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1997).
48. Barnard & Downing, supra note 42, at 564.
49. 348 A.2d 910 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
50. Id. at913.
51. 694 A.2d 1134 (Pa. Comnw. Ct. 1997).
52. Id. at 1138. ("The executive order would carry only the implication of a penalty for
noncompliance, such as a possible removal from office, an official demotion, restrictions on
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executive order does not explicitly create one.
B. State Constitutions
Claims of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation have faired
better under state constitutions than under the Federal Constitution.
Arguably, this is due in part to the jurisprudencial diversity produced by a
federalist system.53 However, of particular significance is the fact that
eighteen states have adopted an equal rights amendment ("ERA").54  If
same-sex couples seeking benefits can argue that the state is making a
distinction on the basis of sex, an ERA will bring strict scrutiny to bear
rather than intermediate scrutiny.5 In some cases, this difference can be
decisive.
56In Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that a statute that
denies the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples runs afoul of Hawaii's
equal protection clause where it does not further compelling state interests
and is not too narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of
constitutional rights.57 The court reached this conclusion in three elegant
steps.58 First, the court cited Loving v. Virginia5 9 for the principle that a
responsibilities, a reprimand, or a loss of favor.") (quoting trial court).
53. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison) (discussing the multiplicity of rights
and responsibilities under a federalist system); see also Melanie D. Price, The Privacy
Paradox: The Divergent Paths of the United States Supreme Court and State Courts on
Issues of Sexuality, 33 IND. L. REv. 863 (2000) (contrasting federal constitutional
jurisprudence regarding the privacy rights of gays and lesbians with that of the states).
54. See Paul Benjamin Linton, State Equal Rights Amendments: Making a Difference or
Making a Statement?, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 907, 941-44 (1997). The states that have adopted
equal rights amendments are: Alaska, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3 (1972); California, CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 8 (1879); Colorado, COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29 (1973); Connecticut, CONN.
CONST. art. 1, § 20 (1974); Hawaii, HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (1972); Illinois, ILL. CONST. art.
I, § 17 (1971); Louisiana, LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1974); Maryland, MD. CONST., art. 46
(1972); Massachusetts, MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 1 (1976); Montana, MONT. CONST. art. II, §
4 (1973); New Hampshire, N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2 (1974); New Mexico, N.M. CONST. art.
II, § 18 (1973); Pennsylvania, PA. CONST. art. I, § 28 (1971); Texas, TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a
(1972); Utah, UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1896); Virginia, VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1971);
Washington, WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 (1972); and Wyoming, WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 2
(1890).
55. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) ("Accordingly, we hold that sex
is a 'suspect category' for purposes of equal protection analysis under article I, section 5 of
the Hawaii Constitution and that HRS § 572-1 is subject to the 'strict scrutiny' test.")
(citations omitted); see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982) (defining the burden a party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on
the basis of their gender must satisfy).
56. 852 P.2d 44, reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
57. Id. at 59 (itemizing fourteen "salient marital rights and benefits ... of note").
58. Id. at 57-68.
59. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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statute prohibiting miscegenation fails strict scrutiny even where (1) the
traditional notions of marriage did not encompass a union between
members of different races, and (2) the statute burdens both races the
same.60 Second, the court found that Hawaii's ERA necessitated that state
distinctions based on sex be evaluated with strict scrutiny.61 Third, the
court merely substituted sex for race in Loving's strict scrutiny analysis to
hold that the denial of the benefits of marriage to same-sex partners is
discrimination on the basis of sex, even though (1) the denial of marriage
licenses to same-sex partners burden men and women the same, and (2)
marriage has traditionally been held to mean a union between a man and
woman.
62
The Baehr court employed this reasoning to address two popular
arguments used to deny marriage benefits to same-sex partners. The first
argument is adopted by Judge Heen in his dissent to the Baehr opinion.
Judge Heen states that a statute restricting marriage to opposite-sex
partners "does not establish a 'suspect' classification based on gender
because all males and females are treated alike. ' 63 The plurality counters
by substituting sex for race in the Loving analysis, holding that "equal
application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of
[strict scrutiny equal protection analysis]. 64  The second argument is
expressed most succinctly in Jones v. Hallahan. In Jones, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals affirmed a ruling denying a marriage license to a same-
66sex couple. The court held that because marriage had always been
considered the union of a man and woman, it was the very definition of
marriage, and not the laws of Kentucky, which prevented them from
60. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61-63 ("[T]he Virginia courts declared that interracial marriage
simply could not exist because the Deity had deemed such a union intrinsicly unnatural.");
id at 63, quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 8 ("[W]e reject the notion that the mere "equal
application" of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the
classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscriptions of all invidious racial
discriminations....").
61. Id. at 66-67 (reasoning that since Justice Powell's concurrence in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), joined by Chief Justice Renquest and Justice Blackmun,
indicated that the adoption of the federal ERA would subject classifications on the basis of
sex to strict scrutiny, and since Hawaii has adopted its own ERA, the Hawaii constitution
applies strict scrutiny to statutory sex-based distinctions).
62. Id. at 68 ("Substitution of "sex" for "race" and article I, section 5 [of the Hawaii
Constitution] for the fourteenth amendment yields [from Loving] the precise case before us
together with the conclusion that we have reached."). See John G. Culhane, Uprooting the
Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARDozo L. REV. 1119, 1171-1180 (1999)
(analyzing in depth this analogy to the Loving Court's argument).
63. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71 (citation omitted).
64. Id. at 67-68.
65. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
66. Id.
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receiving a marriage license.67 The Loving analogy used by the Baehr
court unravels this argument, as it corrects the faulty assumption that equal
protection analysis does not bear upon classifications rooted in traditional
68notions.
It is ironic that the Baehr court makes such good use of the Federal
Constitution, a document that has been for the most part unhelpful in the
movement for gay and lesbian civil rights. 69 This highlights the importance
of a state ERA in establishing remedies for those seeking same-sex
domestic partner benefits. The Hawaii court's use of Loving is predicated
on it's application of Hawaii's ERA. Without it, the reasoning of Loving
remains inapplicable. The great majority of cases following Baehr that
litigated the issue of same-sex marriage or same-sex domestic partner
benefits under state constitutions found that those constitutions offered
little or no remedy.70 Some of these cases are distinguishable from Baehr,
while others reject its reasoning as unpersuasive without much justification.
A survey of two such cases is instructive in assessing the qualities of a
successful state constitutional argument.
In Lilly v. Minneapolis,71 a Minnesota district court rejected the same
argument made by the plaintiffs in Baehr, finding that Minnesota law did
not support the Hawaii Supreme Court's interpretation of Loving in this
context. The court distinguished the case before it by stating that "marriage
does not require racial similarity" but does require gender dissimilarity.
72
This reading of Loving demonstrates that the court failed to recognize its
essential holding that traditional conceptions of what a marriage is must
yield when they interfere with the equal protection of law. Thus, where the
court claims to distinguish the case before it from Loving, it actually signals
its intent to reject Loving as a precedent altogether. When the court cites
"commonsense" as an authority supporting their refusal to apply equal
protection analysis to traditional notions of who should be married, they
mirror eerily the sentiments of the Virginia trial judge who presided over
71the Lovings' claim more than thirty years prior.
67. Id. at 589-90.
68. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63 ("[A]s Loving amply demonstrates, constitutional law may
mandate, like it or not, that customs change with an evolving social order.").
69. See Culhane, supra note 62, at 1154-64.
70. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 225-26 (Tex. App. 1999) (citing Baehr as the
only authority holding in favor of same-sex marriages and listing four other authorities
rejecting same-sex marriage).
71. No. MC 93-21375, 1994 WL 315620, at *1 (June 3, 1994) aff'd on different
grounds, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
72. Id. at* 12.
73. Id. at *13. The trial judge in Loving stated:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he
placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his
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In Rutgers Council of AA UP Chapters v. Rutgers,74 appellants sought
health benefits for their same-sex partners. The New Jersey Superior
Court affirmed the lower court's denial of these benefits. It refused to
follow the Baehr court's interpretation of Loving because, among other
reasons, there was no evidence of invidious intent on the part of the
legislature.76 Although the Rutgers court's reasoning for not following
Loving is certainly more lucid than that of the Lilly court, it still fails to
distinguish the facts of the case at hand from those of Loving.
One cannot distinguish Loving from Rutgers on the basis of the
presence or absence of legislative invidious intent. There is no evidence of
explicit invidious intent in either case. If we are inclined to infer animus in
the racially restrictive manner that Virginia chose to limit marriage, we
must also infer such animus in the manner that New Jersey chooses to limit
it.
The Virginia legislature enacted a miscegenation law with the stated
intent of preserving the integrity of the white race.77 The preservation of
racial integrity as a state goal is in itself no more invidious than the
preservation of traditional notions of marriage. Both seek to preserve an
established norm and both equally burden individuals on either side of the
distinction they draw: white and non-white in the former case, male and
female in the latter. We rightly perceive miscegenation laws as invidious
by placing them in the historical context of racial animus. We rightly
perceive them as discriminatory by noting who is shut out by the state's
determination of what is worth preserving. Our perception regarding the
intent of the miscegenation laws enjoys the benefit of hindsight. Laws that
shut gays and lesbians out from the benefits of marriage are no less
invidious, no less discriminatory.7  Invidious intent is no basis for
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.
388 U.S., 3 (1962). The trial judge in Lilly stated: "[W]omen whose partners are women
cannot marry those partners." 1994 WL 315620, at *12. Both statements represent the
"commonsense" reasoning of their respective eras, but neither has anything to do with the
application of the equal protection clause.
74. 689 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 837 ("We see no intent by the Legislature, in enacting [the State Health
Benefits Plan], to discriminate against lesbian or gay male persons.").
77. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 n.l ("[mhe State's concern in these statutes, as expressed
in the words of the 1924 Act's title, 'An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity,' extends only to
the integrity of the white race.").
78. See Michael Mello, For Today, I'm Gay: The Unfinished Battle for Same-Sex
Marriage in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REv. 149, 229 (2000) (comparing Take it to the People, a
Vermont advocacy group opposed to gay marriage, with the "respectable" segregationist
White Citizens Councils of the Jim Crow South). "Substitute 'race' for 'homosexuals' in
their position," Mello asserts, "and their bigotry becomes clear." Id.
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distinguishing Loving from Rutgers or any other case in which the
legislature employs traditional notions of what comprises a marriage to
deny equal protection of the laws to same-sex partners.
Neither the Minnesota nor the New Jersey Constitution contains an
ERA. Thus, even if the courts in Lilly and Rutgers had found Loving
applicable, they would be under no obligation to apply a strict scrutiny
analysis to the sex-based distinction that the Loving analogy makes plain.
Where a court is not compelled to apply heightened scrutiny to a statutory
distinction, it is unlikely to invalidate it on constitutional grounds.79
However, an ERA is not the only path to heightened scrutiny for
distinctions that deny benefits enjoyed by married couples to same-sex
partners. Two recent cases overturned the denial of benefits to same-sex
partners on the basis of state constitutions, which did not have an ERA.
In Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University,8° an Oregon
appellate court8' found that denial of benefits to same-sex partners violated
the state constitution even in the absence of an equal rights amendment.
2
The plaintiff in Tanner succeeded where so many others have failed83 for
two reasons: (1) the court found same-sex domestic partners to be members
of a "suspect class," and (2) the court found that the plan's discrimination
on the basis of marital status had an impermissible disparate impact on
85same-sex domestic partners. The court's argument in Tanner is
qualitatively different from that in Baehr. Although the Oregon Supreme
Court had previously held sex to be a suspect class, disparate treatment
79. See Farrell, supra note 13, at 357.
80. 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)
81. Neither party appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court because, among other reasons,
the employer had voluntarily extended benefits to same-sex partners by the time the
appellate court had ruled. See Filippi & Reeves, supra note 3, at 295.
82. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 448 ("We conclude that OHSU's denial of insurance benefits to
the unmarried domestic partners of its homosexual employees violated Article I, section 20
of the Oregon Constitution .... ). Article I, section 20 reads: "No law shall be passed
granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same
terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." OR. CONST. art. I, § 20.
83. See Barnard & Downing, supra note 42, at 573 ("To date, courts have rejected this
argument.").
84. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 447 ("[We have no difficulty concluding that plaintiffs are
members of a suspect class.").
85. Id. at 447-48 ("OHSU's intentions in this case are not relevant. What is relevant is
the extent to which privileges or immunities are not made available to all citizens on equal
terms.... Homosexual couples may not marry. Accordingly, the benefits are not made
available on equal terms. They are made available on terms that, for gay and lesbian
couples, are a legal impossibility."). For another successful claim of disparate impact
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, see Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d
1099 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that the university's denial of housing to a lesbian couple
violated a city ordinance that prohibited discrimination in housing on the basis of sexual
orientation).
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thereof, is subject to strict scrutiny,86 the Tanner court did not evaluate the
discrimination on the basis of sex. Rather, it held that gays and lesbians
themselves constitute a suspect class . 7 The court addressed this issue as a
matter of first impression and arrived at its finding on the grounds that
"[s]exual orientation, like gender, race, alienage, and religious affiliation is
widely regarded as defining a distinct, socially recognized group of
citizens, and certainly it is beyond dispute that homosexuals in our society
have been, and continue to be, the subject of adverse social and political
stereotyping and prejudice."' 8
In Baehr, the Hawaii court used its Loving analogy to address the
argument that a statute that prohibits same-sex partners from enjoying the
benefits of marriage is facially neutral. The Tanner court relied on another
approach, finding that such prohibitions have a disparate impact on same-
sex partners and are discriminatory even where facially neutral.89
The success of Tanner can be traced in part to the idiosyncratic
jurisprudence surrounding Oregon's Privileges and Immunities clause. The
favorable outcome in Baker v. Vermont90 is likewise related to some unique
provisions of Vermont's constitution. In Baker, the claim was analogous to
that in Baehr. The plaintiffs, a number of same-sex couples, sought a
declaratory judgement against the state for refusing to issue them marriage
licenses. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal
of the claim, but relied upon a very different analysis than that present in
Baehr or Tanner. The court held that denying marriage licenses to same-
sex partners violated the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont
Constitution.9' The clause reads: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be,
instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people,
nation, or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of
any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that
community ... ,,92
The court applied this clause to hold that the "legal benefits and
protections" derived from marriage are so substantial that any legal
restrictions on who may marry must be "grounded on public concerns of
86. Hewitt v. SAIF, 653 P.2d 970, 976 (Or. 1982).
87. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 447. The term "suspect class" relates to Article I, section 20 of
Oregon's constitution, and although its usage here is similar to its usage in federal Equal
Protection analysis, Article I, section 20 is not an equal protection clause. Rather, Article I,
section 20 guarantees that "no law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens
privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens." OR. CONST. art I, § 20.
88. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 447.
89. Id. Oregon caselaw applies Article I, section 20 even where the discrimination is
not intentional. See Zockert v. Fanning, 800 P.2d 773 (Or. 1990).
90. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
91. Id. at 886.
92. VT. CoNsT. ch. I, art. 7.
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sufficient weight, cogency, and authority that the justice of the deprivation
cannot seriously be questioned."93 It further found that denying same-sex
couples the right to marry does not reasonably promote the stated
government concern of "promoting a commitment between married
couples to promote the security of their children and the community as a
whole," because same-sex couples and opposite-sexed couples are
identically situated regarding this concern.94
In focusing on the validity of the means employed to promote the
legislature's stated goal, rather than focusing on the existence of a special
class, the reasoning in Baker resembles a rational basis analysis more than
a heightened scrutiny analysis.95 Baker draws out the hit or miss nature of
state consititutional litigation: whereas many claims fail even when
supported by constitutional ammendments granting heightened scrutiny to
distinctions made on the basis of sex,96 some claims succeed under nothing
more than a flavor of the rational basis test.97 For state employees seeking
benefits for a same-sex partner, state constitutional claims are a crap
shoot." Unfortunately, this "crap shoot" is often the best chance same-sex
93. Baker, 744 A.2d at 884.
94. Id. Of significance, the court takes note that the number of children being raised by
same-sex couples is rising, and that the state legislature has eliminated barriers to adoption
by same-sex couples. Id. at 881.
95. But see id. at 889-97 (Dooley, J., concurring) (suggesting that the court should have
followed the persuasive authority of Tanner and employed a more tiered analysis for
violations of Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution).
96. See, e.g., Hinman v. Dep't of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 416 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) ("[P]laintiffs are not similarly situated to heterosexual ... employees with spouses.
They are similarly situated to other unmarried... employees. Unmarried employees are all
given the same benefits; plaintiffs have not shown that unmarried homosexual employees
are treated differently than unmarried heterosexual employees."). But note that California's
ERA is somewhat limited, stating merely that "[a] person may not be disqualified from
entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or employment because of sex ... 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8.
97. Although the court in Baker makes clear that Vermont's Common Benefits Clause
sets a higher burden than, and is not analogous to, rational basis under the United States
Constitution, the wording of the two doctrines is similar. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 871 (1999)
("Article 7 ... require[s] a 'more stringent' reasonableness inquiry than was generally
associated with rational basis review under the federal constitution."); but see id. at 878-79
(stating the issue under the Common Benefits Clause as "whether the omission of a part of
the community from the benefit, protection and security of the challenged law bears a
reasonable and just relation to the governmental purpose").
98. To complicate matters more, successful claims may provoke legislative action.
Some such legislation, such as the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat.
2419 (1996), seeks to reign in advancements made in court. Other legislation can have a
neutral or even positive impact. Vermont, for example, responded to the Baker ruling by
passing a civil union regime. H.R. Joum., 65th Gen. Assemb., Adjourned Sess., at 1079 (Vt.
Apr. 25, 2000). The legislation represents a middle ground between recognition of gay
marriage and prohibition through constitutional amendment. See Recent Legislation:
Vermont Creates System of Civil Unions, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1421 (2001).
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partners have available to them in their pursuit of domestic partner benefits.
C. State Statutes
Several states have statutes prohibiting discrimination in employment
on the basis of sexual orientation.99 The remaining states have statutes
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex and/or marital status. To
date, no claim for same-sex domestic partner benefits has succeeded under
any such statute.' The fact that even the Tanner court rejected the
plaintiffs claim under Oregon's employment discrimination statute
illustrates the difficulty of obtaining a remedy under state statutes.
The difficulties that employees have encountered when they sue for
benefits for their same-sex partners under state statutes arise from two
obstacles: (1) the court must find the denial of benefits to be discrimination
on the same basis as that prohibited by the statute, i.e. sex, sexuality, or
marital status; and (2) the statute must apply to employment benefits.
Arguments that the denial of benefits constitutes discrimination on the
basis of sex or sexuality are weakened by the state's contention that
eligibility standards are not established with invidious intent. The state
furthermore contends that the basis of the distinction is actually marital
status, since all unmarried partners are treated alike regardless of sexuality.
Arguments that a statute concerning the terms and conditions of
employment covers discrimination in benefits often fail because many such
statutes explicitly exclude benefit plans from the statutes' scope of
application.'0  Several cases illustrate the imposing nature of these
obstacles.
99. Twelve states and the District of Columbia have statutes which prohibit
discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation. Lynd, supra note 7, at 581.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (Deering 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c
(West 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512(a) (recodified § 2-1402-11 (2001)); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 378-2 (1993); MASS. GEN. ANN. LAWs ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1996); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 363.03 (West Supp. 2000); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 613.330 (Michie Supp. 1999);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:1 (Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-5-7 (1995); 21 VT. STAT. ANN. § 495 (Supp. 1999); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.36(1)(d) (West 1997). See also OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030(1) (1999) (prohibiting
discrimination in employment on the basis of the sex of an individual with whom one
associates).
100. See Fisk, supra note 6, at 277-78 ("To date, no state or city has attempted to enforce
a general nondiscrimination law against a private sector employer's benefit plan that
provides benefits only to spouses or dependents .... "). Suits against public employers on
such a basis have also been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Tanner v. Oregon Health Scis. Univ.,
971 P.2d 435, 442 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that statute which prohibited discrimination
on the basis of the sex of an individual with whom one associates not violated where state
denies benefits to same-sex partner of employee).
101. See Lynd, supra note 7, at 581-82 ("[E]ven if a statute prohibits sexual orientation
discrimination, employee benefits may be exempt from the statute.").
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Tanner offers a pointed example of the difficulties in suing for same-
sex domestic partner benefits under a state employment discrimination
statute, because the court was relatively sympathetic to the plaintiffs'
claims.' °2 Oregon's statute does not refer directly to sexuality. However,
plaintiffs argued that since the statute prohibits discrimination "because of
an individual's... sex.... or because of the... sex of any other person
with whom the individual associates", °103 and because the denial of benefits
in effect discriminated against the employee because of the sex of her
partner, the statute applied. The court agreed, rejecting the state's
counterarguments that the denial of benefits was on the basis of marital
status because it found that the denial had a disparate impact on same-sex
couples.
14
Although the Tanner court concluded that Oregon Statute § 659.030
did apply to the state's rejection of same-sex domestic partner benefits, the
court ultimately rejected the plaintiff's statutory claim. Another Statute,
Oregon Statute § 659.028, restricted the application.
employment discrimination law with regard to "the terms of a bona
fide employee benefit plan."'0 5 This statute provided that discrimination
with regard to benefits is only actionable when it is the result of
"subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the fair employment statutes.]"' 6
Thus the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate invidious intent. Since
there was no evidence that the state sought to discriminate against same-sex
partners when it established its elegibility standards, the plaintiffs lost on
the statutory claim.'07
The plaintiffs in Tanner ultimately lost their statutory claim due to
qualifications of the state's employment discrimination law. States have
limited the applicability of their employment discrimination statutes in two
ways: (1) by excluding their application to employee benefits, and (2) by
precluding their application such that the state appears to endorses or
validate same-sex partnerships. There is little dispute that employee
benefits constitute a "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
102. See discussion supra 25-27.
103. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659.030(1)(a)-(b).
104. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 441-42. Despite the court's rejection of defendant OSHU's
argument, challenges to benefit policy discrimination at the state and local level are more
often than not unsuccessful. See Lynd, supra note 7, at 563 n.5 (listing unsuccessful
challenges).
105. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 659.028 (1999).
106. Id.; Tanner, 971 P.2d at 443.
107. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 444. When the state makes marital status its basis for benefits
elegibility, it does so without any explicit animus towards gays and lesbians since it is a
"commonsense" basis for determining who should be covered. See Lilly v. Minneapolis, No.
MC 93-21275, 1994 WL 315620, at *13 (Minn. Super. Ct. June 3, 1994). However, just as
the facially neutral miscegenation laws in Loving represented deep seated racial animus, the
use of marital status as a basis represents deep seated heterosexist notions.
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employment" and thus employment discrimination statutes containing this
or similar language pertain to discrimination in benefits.03 However,
several states explicitly exclude benefits plans from the coverage of their
employment discrimination statutes 3 9 In many cases, this is to reduce the
overlap of law regulating employment and insurance.11°
Such qualifications do not always foreclose the use of employment
discrimination statutes. In Lukus v. Westinghouse Electronic Corp., the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act applied to Westinghouse's denial of disability compensation
to pregnant women in spite of 43 P.S. § 955(a), which held that it would
not apply to the "operation of the terms or conditions of any bona fide
group or employe insurance plan.111  The court stated that the denial of
coverage "has nothing to do with the underwriting or rate-making practices
of insurance companies, or the operation of the terms or conditions of the
plan," and characterized it as "Westinghouse's decision to compensate its
employees for all disabilities but pregnancy, a decision that is not
qualitatively different from other decisions Westinghouse makes regarding
other forms of employment compensation."'1 2 Thus, if the decision to deny
benefits can be characterized as a case of arbitrary compensation rather
than the "operation of the terms and conditions" of a plan, this qualification
of the PCRA can be circumvented. The plaintiffs in Lukus succeeded with
their claim. Plaintiffs seeking benefits for their same-sex partners have not
been so lucky. In Rutgers, the plaintiffs' statutory claims were rejected
because New Jersey employment discrimination law does not reach
discrimination in benefits
13
Other states limit the applicability of their employment discrimination
statutes to ensure that the state does not effectively endorse same-sex
108. See Stephen T. Kaminski, Must Employers Pay for Viagra? An Americans with
Disabilities Act Analysis Post-Bragdon and Sutton, 4 DEPAuL J. HEALTH CARE L. 73, 85
(2000) ("Statutory terminology, legislative history, implementing regulations, and case law
interpretation all undeniably indicate that an employee's fringe benefits, including
employer-provided health benefits, are among the 'terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment."'); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682
(1983) (holding that employee benefits are "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment" under Title VII).
109. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a) (West 2002) ("The provision of this
paragraph shall not apply, to ... operation of the terms or conditions of any bona fide group
or employe insurance plan."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-2.1 (West 2002) (stating that the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination does not apply to employee benefit plans).
110. See, e.g., Lukus v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 419 A.2d 431, 449 (1980) ("We
therefore conclude that section 955(a)(3) was enacted as a jurisdictional device separating
the regulatory realms of the PHRC and the Insurance Commissioner.").
111. Id. at 449-50.
112. Id. at450.
113. Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapter v. Rutgers, 689 A.2d 828, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1997).
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relationships or the concept of "gay marriage." Massachusetts law
prohibiting discrimination against gays and lesbians states: "Nothing in this
act shall be construed so as to legitimize or validate a 'homosexual
marriage,' so-called, or to provide health insurance or related employee
benefits to a 'homosexual spouse,' so-called."' 14  Similarly, Alaska
employment discrimination law provides: "[n]otwithstanding the
prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of marital
status or parenthood under (a) of this section, (1) an employer may, without
violating this chapter, provide greater health and retirement benefits to
employees who have a spouse or dependent children than are provided to
other employees."'" 5 Thus, Alaskan employment discrimination law will
not reach discrimination in domestic partner benefits if the recipient does
not meet the state's definition of a "spouse."
Statutes which prohibit discrimination in employment are not the only
state laws which offer the potential of remedies to employees seeking
same-sex domestic partner benefits. Suits may also be brought under
statutes which regulate insurance practices. The main drawback with such
statutes is that they do not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexuality,
and those which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex are vulnerable
to the often successful arguments, illustrated above, that the denial of
benefits to same-sex partners is not sex discrimination.
D. Local Ordinances
Local ordinances prohibiting discrimination in employment on the
basis of sexual orientation provide a potential remedy to the greatest
number of state employees seeking benefits for their same-sex spouse.16
However, several commentators have noted that these local ordinances
have been of little help in the movement to obtain such benefits."7 Their
114. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (notes) (West 2001).
115. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(c)(1) (Michie 2001).
116. Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First
Amendment Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 189, 192
n.2 (1999) (citing a study by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force that one out of four
Americans is covered by local laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexuality and
a survey by the LeGal Foundation of the Lesbian & Gay Law Association of Greater New
York finding that seventy percent of New Yorkers are covered by local ordinances
prohibiting discrimination against gays and lesbians); NAN D. HUNTER ET AL., THE RIGHTS
OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A GAY PERSON'S RIGHTS 204-08
(3d ed. 1992) (listing over 100 local municipalities which prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexuality).
117. See, e.g., Barbara Case, Repealable Rights: Municipal Civil Rights Protection for
Lesbians and Gays, 7 LAW & INEQ. 441, 445, 456 (1989); Pat P. Putignano, Note, Why
DOMA and Not ENDA?: A Review of Recent Federal Hostility to Expand Employment
Rights and Protection Beyond Traditional Notions, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 177, 188-
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ineffectiveness derives from their vulnerability. Not only must claims
under such statutes overcome all the obstacles discussed in the previous
section,"' but they must also circumvent several new pitfalls. Local anti-
discrimination ordinances are often found to be invalid, either because state
statutes preempt them or because the municipality is found to lack the
authority to enact them." 9
States differ in the amount of authority granted to local municipalities
to enact ordinances.1 20 This results in a striking diversity in the approaches
to local prohibitions against discrimination as well as in the challenges to
them.121 We can, however, draw some general conclusions. Most local
ordinances have the authority to enact local ordinance through the
provision of home rule. 12 The authority granted by home rule varies from
state to state: some municipalities are granted a high degree of autonomy
over local affairs, others retain the authority to legislate some areas of local
concern.12 Regardless of the degree of authority granted, no municipality
may enact an ordinance that concerns matters beyond local affairs or that
conflicts with state law. 24 Thus, although local ordinances will have
varying vulnerability to challenge based on the individual state's provisions
for municipal control, any can be challenged on the basis that they concern
something that is or should be regulated on a state level and are therefore
preempted by a state statute or invalidated by the state constitution.1 5
Pennsylvania law regarding municipal authority illustrates the need
for a nuanced approach in bringing claims based on local ordinances. The
Pennsylvania constitution provides that "[a] municipality which has a home
rule charter may exercise any power or perform any function not denied by
this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at
any time."'126 Thus, the legislature can expressly limit the authority of a
89 (1997); Chad A. Readier, Note, Local Government Anti-Discrimination Laws: Do They
Make a Difference?, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 777 (1998).
118. Like constitutional and statutory provisions, ordinances which prohibit
discrimination according to sexual orienation must still reach employee benefit plans to be
of use to state employees suing for benefits for their same-sex domestic painters. Some
ordinances extend benefits to same-sex domestic partners explicitly, avoiding this
complication but raising others. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a law preferencing city contractors who extended benefits to
same-sex domestic partners did not violate the commerce clause or exceed the city's
authority to pass local ordinances).
119. Id.
120. Readier, supra note 117, at 796.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 785.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 785-86.
125. Id. at 793-94
126. PA. CONST. art. 9, § 2.
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municipality to enact ordinances. Furthermore, Pennsylvania courts have
held that statutes regarding substantive matters of statewide concern can
preempt or invalidate local ordinances. 127 If Pennsylvania were to defend a
policy of prohibiting gay marriage in violation of a local ordinance, it
would likely argue that marriage is an area of statewide concern. However,
such a defense would be vulnerable to the argument that state regulation of
marriage is not inconsistent with a local ordinance extending the benefits of
marriage to gays and lesbians. 128 More to the point, if Pennsylvania were to
defend a policy of employment discrimination against gays and lesbians in
violation of a local ordinance, it would have to argue that employment
discrimination is a matter of statewide concern and that statutes prohibiting
employment discrimination, albeit not discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, preempt the local ordinances. This argument might not prevail,
since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that "municipalities in the
exercise of the police power may regulate certain occupations by imposing
restrictions which are in addition to, and not in conflict with, statutory
regulations."' 29
Thus, successfully arguing that a local anti-discrimination ordinance
does not represent a use of local authority explicitly prohibited by state
statute or constitution and is not inconsistent with state legislation
regarding matters of statewide concern is the first step in bringing such an
ordinance to bear on an employer. Unfortunately, claims premised on such
ordinances often do not make it past this step. 30
1. Collective Bargaining Agreements
A final remedy for state employees seeking benefits for their same-sex
127. Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 152, 156 (Pa. 1996) (invalidating local
ordinances which regulated assault weapons because the state assembly had explicitly
denied municipalities the power to regulate arms).
128. This is notwithstanding the presence of a statutory definition of marriage as the
union of a man and a woman. See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110
Stat. 2419 (1996) (defining marriage as "a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife").
129. W. Pa. Rest. Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh, 77 A.2d 616, 620 (Pa. 1951).
130. See, e.g., Delaney v. Superior Fast Freight, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 36-38 (Ca. 1993)
(finding that state law preempts a local ordinance); McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 570 A.2d 834
(Md. 1990) (finding that an ordinance sought to legislate in an area reserved for the state);
Hutchcraft Van Serv., Inc. v. City of Urbana Human Relations Comm'n, 433 N.E.2d 329,
333-34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (finding that state law preempted a local ordinance); Lilly v.
City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)(finding that same-sex
partnerships are an issue of statewide concern and thus invalidating an ordinance). But see,
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding a local
ordinace banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); City of Atlanta v.
McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517, 522 (Ga. 1995) (same).
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partner is the collective bargaining agreement between their union and the
state. Unions that bargain for a clause in the agreement which prohibits the
employer from discriminating on the basis of sexual orienation can
theoretically bind the employer to that clause. Bringing a clause that
merely prohibited discrimination in the terms of employment on the basis
of sexual orientation to bear on the denial of benefits, however, would raise
many of the same obstacles encountered with statutory claims. Successful
claims resting on collective bargaining agreements are rare. In Tumeo v.
University of Alaska, the judge considered the agreement in addressing a
claim brought by univesity employees after the university refused to extend
benefits to same-sex domestic partners.131 It is not clear how great a role
the agreement played in the court's favorable holding, but the judge did
132discuss the agreement and cite contract law in the decision. Although the
collective bargaining agreement can serve as a resource to those seeking
same-sex domestic partner benefits, its effectiveness as a legal claim
against the employer remains relatively untested.
2. Issues Regarding Employee Benefit Trusts
Most of the claims discussed above seek to hold employers liable for
discrimination regarding the terms and conditions of employment on the
basis of sexual orientation. However, in many cases the employee's direct
employer does not make decisions regarding benefit eligibility. Rather,
these decisions are made by the trustees who administer the benefits plan
for the employer. Often, these trustees include union representatives as
well as management from a number of different employers. Consequently,
finding an employee benefits trust fund liable under statutory prohibitions
against employment discrimination can be complicated.
Several federal circuits have heard cases regarding whether employee
benefits trust funds are liable as employers under federal employment
discrimination law. The most frequently cited case 133 on this issue is
Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of
New England, Inc. 34 Carparts involves the administering trust of an
employee benefits fund capping the lifetime benefits available for AIDS-
related illnesses following the diagnosis of an employee as HIV positive.
The employee sued the trust under the Americans with Disability Act
("ADA"). 35 The First Circuit held that an administering trust for a health
131. No. 4FA-94-43 Civ., 1995 WL 238359, at *3 (Alaska Super. Jan. 11, 1995).
132. Id.
133. A Westlaw keycite search restricted to the related headnote brought up 114 citing
references.
134. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
135. 42U.S.C. §12101,etseq. (2002).
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benefit plan is liable as an employer under the ADA if it, (1) "exercised
control over an important aspect of [the employee's] employment,"
including health benefits, or, (2) acted as the employer's agent "in the
matter of providing and administering employee health benefits.' 36
Other courts have similarly held that the definition of employer under
Title VII 137 is sufficiently broad as to include benefit program
administrators. 138 Thus, by analogy, a state employee might argue that the
trust that administers her employee health benefits is liable under state and
local statutes prohibiting discrimination by employers.
Such an argument is not likely to prevail elsewhere. The Fifth Circuit,
for example, has chosen not to follow Carparts.139 In Bloom v. Bexar
County, the Court of Appeals held that the chief consideration in
determining liability under the ADA is whether a party has "control [of] an
employee's conduct."1 40  Since employee benefit trusts do not control
employee conduct, they are not employers under the ADA and cannot be
held liable. As a consequence of the ambiguity caused by this circuit split,
state employees who attempt to hold their employee benefits trust liable for
a denial of benefits to their same-sex domestic partner may find their claim
dismissed because the trust is not considered an employer under the
statutory language of the state or local law prohibiting employment
discrimination.
Exploring the potential elements of a state employee's claim to same-
sex domestic partner benefits offers some insight into the status of gay and
lesbian rights outside the shadow of ERISA preemption. Because
constitutions, statutes, and ordinances prohibiting discrimination vary in
their substantive protections from state to state, and because the scope of
these protections is often ambiguous, plaintiffs must weave a claim out of
a multitude of disjointed arguments. Although the tapestry of arguments
created by this process reflects a valid assertion of the rights which all
should by law enjoy, the litigant knows that each thread remains vulnerable
to judicial discretion. Certainly, an alternative strategy exists. A judicial or
legislative recognition of gay marriage would sweep away the numerous
obstacles present in a claim for the extension of benefits to same-sex
136. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 17. See also U.S. v. Ill., No. 93 C 7741, 1994 WL 562180
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (finding the Board of Trustees of the City of Aurora Police Pension Fund
liable under the ADA for disqualifying police and firefighters with certain disabilities from
the pension fund). The Carparts court also cites Title VII caselaw from other circuits that
suggests that liability may attach to parties who are not the direct employer. Carparts, 37
F.3d at 18.
137. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2002).
138. See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982);
Barone v. Hackett, 602 F. Supp. 481,483 (D.R.I. 1984).
139. See Bloom v. Bexar County, 130 F.3d 722 (5th Cir. 1997).
140. Id. at 725.
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domestic partners. Although this approach has the virtue of simplicity, it is
unclear whether it would be more successful. To date, only Vermont has
enacted legislation recognizing civil unions, a legal relationship providing
gay and lesbian couples with the same rights and benefits as married
heterosexual couples. 141  Furthermore, this strategy involves de-
emphasizing specific employment rights and validating an institution that
many find problematic. 
42
Success on a large scale still eludes gays and lesbians seeking to
secure the same kind of employee benefits that their co-workers' spouses
enjoy. However, the diversity of responses by different jurisdictions to the
claims presented suggests that the jurisprudence is shifting. Hopefully
soon, laws which discriminate on the basis of the sexual makeup of a
committed relationship will be considered as backwards as Virginia's
miscegenation laws of forty years ago.
141. H.R. Joum., 65th Gen. Assemb., Adjourned Sess., at 1079 (Vt. Apr. 25, 2000).
142. See, e.g., Nancy Polikoff, We Vill Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and
Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,"
79 VA. L. REv. 1535, 1536 (1993) ("[TJhe desire to marry in the lesbian and gay community
is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society, an effort to fit into an inherently
problematic institution that betrays the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and
radical feminism."); Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims For Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to
Legitimate a Retreat From Marriage by Redefining Marriage 39 S. TEx. L. REV. 735, 757
("[Mhere is an "intra-community" debate over whether gays and lesbians should seek
legalization of same-sex marriage.").
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